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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 19/04/2006 Accident number: 56 
Accident time: 08:15 Accident Date: 31/07/1997 
Where it occurred: Huambo Airport Country: Angola 
Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Inadequate training (?)
Class: Excavation accident Date of main report: 12/08/1997 
ID original source: MD/SP/MJ/TJ Name of source: INAROEE 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: PPM-2 AP blast Ground condition: hard 
Date record created: 23/01/2004 Date  last modified: 23/01/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: Huambo  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet: 256 
Map name: 1:100 000  
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate equipment (?) 
inadequate medical provision (?) 
handtool may have increased injury (?) 
inconsistent statements (?) 
safety distances ignored (?) 
no independent investigation available (?) 
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?) 
visor not worn or worn raised (?) 
inadequate area marking (?) 




An internal  commission of inquiry report dated 12th August 1997 was available at the country 
MAC. The following summarises its content.  
The investigators made a site visit between 4-6th August 1997. They found that the accident 
had occurred in a 10k long minefield that circled the airport and was laid by Cuban forces in 
1981-2 (later reinforced by government troops). In the working area there were three mine 
lanes, one with PPM-2 mines and two with PMN mines. OZM-72 mines and MAI-75 mines 
had also been found, along with various UXOs.  
The platoon was clearing a "base line" following a lane of PPM-2 mines. The other mine lanes 
were "visible and had been detected". The victim began work at about 08:00 and got a 
detector reading at the base of a termite mound. He informed the commander and began the 
excavation of the reading to a depth of 5cm.  
Two witnesses "who at this stage were only one metre from the deminer" described his 
attempts at excavation as "futile" because the ground was too hard. The victim used water to 
try to soften the ground but this did not help. He excavated for about eight minutes before the 
detonation occurred at 08:15. The blast was "within half a metre of his body". The victim 
received injuries to his face "and may well lose his sight… his right forearm was later 
amputated….his right leg has fragmentation injuries". The victim was wearing a 
"fragmentation vest" and a visor (both damaged). The plastic handle of the detector and the 
trowel were listed as "broken". The visor was found a metre and a half from the accident site.  
By 08:20 the victim was being treated at the Brazilian hospital. His amputation was completed 
by 10:30 and at 16:00 he was evacuated to Luanda Military Hospital. 
The Platoon Commander said the victim was wearing his visor correctly.  
The Section Commander said the victim was wearing his visor correctly. 
The victim said that his visor was not closed completely but that the accident was his 
"destiny" because his girlfriend had foretold it. 
 
Conclusion 
The investigators found that the victim was only excavating to 5cm which was a breach of 
SOP (which gives 15cm as the excavation depth). The investigators made a similar 
excavation to that achieved by the victim in 8 minutes and it took them 24 minutes. From this 
they concluded that the victim had used unsafe procedures. They decided that the witnesses 
were standing too close to the deminer and may have distracted him and decided that, "an 
indicative figure of 5m will be included in the SOP as a safe distance from a working 
deminer".  
They further found that the trowel used for excavation was unsuitable and that the detector 
was working properly. They also found that some parts of the minefield were inadequately 
marked due to local people stealing the markers. The base line used by the deminers was not 
wide enough (at one meter) and it should not have run along the mine belt but should have 
been parallel to it.  They also found that the brigade paramedics were "below the standard 
required" and the time taken for evacuation to Luanda was criticised.  
The investigators added that delays in deminer payment had left some unable to afford food. 
They were surviving on fruit and water, which had affected morale. 
 
Recommendations 
The investigators stated that the "excavation drill needs to be amended for well compacted 
soil conditions". They advised that future deviations from SOPs must be approved in writing 
and observed that, this being the second PPM-2 accident inside one month, refresher training 
was required immediately. They recommended that the supervisors should be "censured" for 
allowing the victim to excavate using unsafe procedures and that a new "medical plan" for the 




Victim number: 76 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: 5 minutes 
Protection issued: Frag jacket 
Long visor 
Protection used: Frag jacket 
 






Arm Below elbow 
COMMENT 
No medical report was made available. 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Field control inadequacy" because the victim 
was working improperly and was not corrected despite being closely watched.  The fact that 
his supervisors did not seem aware that he was working incorrectly implies a failing higher in 
the management chain responsible for their appointment and training. The secondary cause 
is listed as “Inadequate training”. 
The speed at which the victim worked indicates that, when he used water to try to soften the 
ground to make excavation safer, no time was allowed for the water to permeate.  
The five metre distance from a working deminer recommended by the investigators is 
presumed to have applied to supervisory staff rather than other working deminers.  
It is strange that the victim admitted his visor was raised (confirmed by his injuries) but the 
supervisors were not censured for allowing this to be the case. Either the supervisors were 
ignorant of how a visor should be worn, or they were trying to conceal their own management 
failings when they said that the visor was worn correctly. 
The failures of management listed by the investigators included poor medical provision, 
inadequate site marking and apparent "mine-hunting". 
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